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MANDATORY WAITING PERIODS FOR
ABORTIONS AND FEMALE MENTAL
HEALTH
Jonathan Klickt
INTRODUCTION
Econometric studies of the effects of changes in abortion policy
on a host of social phenomena have proliferated in recent years.1 Re-
searchers have studied the effects of abortion access in many areas
including crime,2 risky sexual behavior,3 child abuse,4 welfare expen-
t Jonathan Klick is the Jeffrey A. Stoops Professor of Law at Florida State
University. He can be contacted at jklick@law.fsu.edu.
1 For a non-technical review of this literature, see Jonathan Klick,
Econometric Analyses of U.S. Abortion Policy: A Critical Review, 31 FORDHAM URB.
L. J. 751 (2004) (using econometric research to analyze the effect of the United
States' abortion policy on sexual behavior, crime, opportunities for women, and
public finance).
2 See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized
Abortion on Crime, 116 Q. J. ECON. 379 (2001) (arguing that legalized abortion has
contributed to a drop in crime rates); Ted Joyce, Did Legalized Abortion Lower
Crime?, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 1 (2004) (finding little evidence that legalized abor-
tion had an effect on crime rates); and John J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, Fur-
ther Evidence That Legalized Abortion Lowered Crime: A Reply to Joyce, 39 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 29 (2004) (linking legalized abortion and reduced crime rates).
3 See, e.g., Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, The Effect of Abortion
Legalization on Sexual Behavior: Evidence from Sexually Transmitted Diseases, 32 J.
LEGAL STUD. 407 (2003) (testing the hypothesis that legalized abortion has led to an
increase in sexually transmitted diseases); and Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann,
Abortion Access and Risky Sex Among Teens: Parental Involvement Laws and Sexu-
ally Transmitted Diseases (Oct. 3, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=819304 (finding that teen gonor-
rhea rates dropped for Hispanic and white teens after implementation of parental
involvement laws concerning abortion; effects on black teens were not statistically
significant).
4 See, e.g., Marianne Bitler and Madeline Zavodny, Child Abuse and Abor-
tion Availability, 92 Am. ECON. Rv. 363 (2002) (analyzing the relationship between
child abuse rates and the legalization of abortion); and Susan B. Sorenson et al., Le-
galized Abortion and the Homicide of Young Children: An Empirical Investigation, 2
ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES PUB. POL'Y 239 (2002) (finding that the legalization of abor-
tion led to a reduction in the number of one- to four-year old homicide victims).
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ditures,5 and demographic changes.6 Others have looked at the effect
of changes in abortion access on the welfare of women as a group,
focusing on the economic opportunities that abortion indirectly pro-
vides to the extent it allows women to take control over their repro-
ductive functions.7
Relying on some of these studies, as well as more normative ar-
guments, abortion rights groups argue that abortion on demand has
significantly improved the lives of women and society more gener-
ally.8 In fighting against state restrictions on abortion access, these
groups suggest women's interests will be harmed if any limitations are
placed on the right to have an abortion.
9
Although anti-abortion groups generally focus on harm done to
the unborn baby to justify the abortion restrictions they seek at both
the state and federal levels,10 in the case of mandatory waiting periods
they appear to depart from their general strategy. The primary argu-
ment offered in support of these waiting periods is that they help
women make more reasoned decisions about the resolution of their
unplanned pregnancies." That is, given the emotionally charged na-
ture of the decision, supporters of waiting periods suggest a cooling
5 See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber et al., Abortion Legalization and Child Living
Circumstances: Who Is the "Marginal Child"?, 114 Q. J. ECON. 253 (1999) (examin-
ing and comparing the potential living circumstances of the marginal child not born
because of abortion to the living circumstances of the average child born).
6 See generally PHILLIP B. LEVINE, SEX AND CONSEQUENCES: ABORTION,
PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE ECONOMICS OF FERTILITY (2004) (analyzing the effect of
abortion Volicy on birth rates domestically and internationally).
See, e.g., Joshua D. Angrist & William N. Evans, Schooling and Labor
Market Consequences of the 1970 State Abortion Reforms (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 5406, 1996). However, for some potential problems
created by abortion availability, see George A. Akerlof et al., An Analysis of Out-of-
Wedlock Childbearing in the United States, 111 Q. J. ECON. 277 (1996) (advancing
theoretical reasons why technical advances in abortion and female contraception have
led to a rise in out-of-wedlock births).
8 See, e.g., SUSANNE PICHLER, PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION OF
AMERICA, INC., MEDICAL AND SOCIAL HEALTH BENEFITS SINCE ABORTION WAS MADE
LEGAL IN THE U.S. (2002), http://www.plannedparenthood.org/pp2/portal/files/portal/
medicalinfo/abortion/fact-abortion-medical-social-benefits.xml.
9 See, e.g., NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, LEADING MEDICAL GROUPS
OPPOSE OBSTACLES TO ABORTION (2002), http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/facts/
loader.cfin?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfn&PageID = 1715.
10 See, e.g., AMERICAN LIFE LEAGUE, FETAL PAIN: AN AGONIZING REALITY,
http://www.all.org/issues/abl2.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2005).
11 See, e.g., Pro-Life News, Waiting Period Does Not Hinder the Murder of
Children, COVENANT NEWS, June 24, 2005, http://www.covenantnews.com/abortion/
archives/0 13201 .html.
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off period so that pregnant women do not make rash decisions they
will later regret.'
2
Opponents of waiting periods believe they do little to improve the
welfare of women. At best, according to many pro-choice advocates,
waiting periods have no effect on women's decisions. At worst, the
delay magnifies a woman's mental anguish in dealing with the un-
wanted pregnancy, as well as extending the period of physical stress.
Often, they claim that waiting periods are simply a device used to
increase the cost and effort involved in securing an abortion.
Although most individuals decide their positions regarding abor-
tion on the basis of normative precepts, the debate about this particu-
lar abortion restriction is premised on empirical assertions. That is,
both sides appear to base their positions on beliefs about how waiting
periods affect the mental health of women. Anti-abortion groups claim
that women tend to make rash decisions about abortion, leading to
regret and emotional distress later in life. In their view, waiting peri-
ods will lead to better decision making processes and, presumably,
less regret. Pro-choice groups, on the other hand, believe waiting pe-
riods are at least an annoyance and might cause significant emotional
or psychological harm as women are kept from exercising their rights.
In this paper, I attempt to shed light on these empirical claims by
analyzing the effect of waiting periods on adult female suicide rates.
My results suggest that waiting periods do improve mental health
among females as evidenced by a statistically and practically signifi-
cant drop in the suicide rate when states adopt waiting periods. The
result does not appear to be an artifact of unobserved heterogeneity or
simultaneity as it is robust to a variety of powerful specifications, in-
cluding instrumental variables analysis.
In the section that follows, I motivate the use of suicide as my
metric of mental health. I then describe the data I use in my analysis
and discuss the statistical models I implement. After that, I present the
results from various specifications to demonstrate that the effect is
robust and appears to be causal. I follow the results with a discussion
of alternate mechanisms that could be generating these results, and I
highlight some extensions of the analysis that are in preparation.
12 See, e.g., National Right to Life Committee, Is Abortion Safe?: Psycho-
logical Consequences, http://www.nrlc.org/abortion/ASMF/asmfl4.html (last visited
Oct. 23, 2005) (describing the psychological effects some women experience after
going through an abortion).
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I. SUICIDE AS A PROXY FOR MENTAL HEALTH
Both sides in the debate about how waiting periods affect the wel-
fare of women make empirical claims about the relationship between
abortion and mental health. Supporters of mandatory delays suggest
that women who make rash, irreversible decisions about their preg-
nancies often regret those decisions. This regret, according to their
claims, leads to depression. Thus, waiting periods should improve the
mental health of women with unwanted pregnancies by giving them a
chance to reflect on their decisions.1 3 Opponents of the laws imply
that delays in securing an abortion at least generate annoyances for
women who do not want to continue their pregnancies. In some cases,
they argue, the delays will actually be harmful to a woman's mental
health as she is forced to second-guess her decision potentially leading
to depression. In this view, the adoption of waiting periods should
lead to either no substantial effect or a negative effect on the mental
health of those seeking an abortion.
Research suggests that suicide is strongly correlated with
depression. 14 Some people who study suicide estimate that more than
two-thirds of people who commit suicide suffer from depressive
illness.' 5 For the present purpose, suicide should be a strong indicator
of poor mental health. One could argue, however, that suicide reflects
only very severe mental health problems. If the anguish created or
mitigated by abortion delay laws is of a relatively small magnitude,
suicide will be largely unaffected by the adoption of the laws. This
concern biases any analysis using suicide as the dependent variable
toward finding no effect of delays on mental health. On the other
hand, if a statistically significant effect of delay laws on suicide is
found, positive or negative, it is reasonable to assume that the effect
underestimates the magnitude of the true causal relationship between
delay laws and mental health.
Further, it is interesting to note, anti-abortion advocates have
claimed there is a causal link between abortion and suicide arising out
of this regret-based depression.' 6 Relying on some academic work on
13 Note that in many states, the waiting period follows the distribution of
counseling materials that include information about alternatives to abortion.
14 See Jonathan Klick & Sara Markowitz, Are Mental Health Insurance
Mandates Effective?: Evidencefrom Suicides, 15 HEALTH ECON. 83, 87 (2006).15 See John T. Maltsberger, The Psychodynamic Formulation: An Aid in
Assessing Suicide Risk, in ASSESSMENT AND PREDICTION OF SUICIDE 25, 31 (Ronald
W. Maris et al. eds., 1992) ("About 70 [percent] [of persons who commit suicide]
have significant depressive illnesses or alcoholism, or both.").
16 See, e.g., National Right to Life Committee, supra note 12.
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the subject, they point out that suicide rates tend to be higher among
women who abort their pregnancy rather than miscarry or carry the
baby to term.' 7 However, such a finding could very well be the result
of a self-selection bias. That is, it could be the case that women who
choose to abort their pregnancies tend to be those who are predisposed
to depression, implying that the link between abortion and suicide is
coincidental as opposed to causal.
From a data perspective, suicide represents a well measured, con-
sistent, and objective metric of mental health. The suicide data that are
used in this analysis cover all known suicides in the country during
the period 1981-1998. Further, at least as regards precise measure-
ment and comprehensiveness, suicide data is far superior to the next
best option, which would involve survey data regarding individuals'
subjective evaluations of their own mental states.
II. DATA
For this paper, I examine state level female suicide rates as my
dependent variable. I focus on suicides among women between the
ages of twenty-five and sixty-four. I do not include very old women
since they are past their reproductive window and their mental health
should not be affected by abortion policy. I also exclude minors and
very young adults since, during this same period, a number of states
passed laws limiting minors' access to abortion.' 8 While these laws
should be unimportant for the mental health of adult women, they
could represent an important confounding effect on the mental health
of teens.19
The female suicide rate is defined as the number of completed
suicides among women age twenty-five to sixty-four in the state per
100,000 women in that age range in the state. My analysis covers the
period 1981-1998. Data on completed suicides come from the Na-
tional Center for Health Statistics' Compressed Mortality File,2°
which contains information on all completed suicides over time.
These data are collected from death certificates filed in each state and
17 Mika Gissler et al., Suicides After Pregnancy in Finland, 1987-94: Regis-
ter Linkafe Study, 313 BRIT. MED. J. 1431, 1431 (1996).
1 These laws took the form of parental involvement laws which require a
minor to get consent from or at least inform her parents that she is planning to get an
abortion.
19 The author is in the process of analyzing teen suicide rates as they relate to
abortion restrictions in a separate paper.
20 Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Preven-
tion, Compressed Mortality File: Underlying Cause of Death, http://wonder.cdc.gov/
mortSQL.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2005).
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include the state of residence, age, race, and gender of each individ-
ual.2 ' In some specifications, I also control for the male suicide rate,
which is acquired from the same source and covers the same age
range.
Data on state adoption of mandatory waiting periods come from
Bitler and Zavodny.22 For a year in which the state had a mandatory
waiting period in place for the entire year, the variable takes the value
of 1. The rest of the observations equal the percent of the year in
which a mandatory delay law was in place. I also include a variable,
constructed in a similar fashion and from the same source, measuring
what fraction of the year the state had restrictions on Medicaid fund-
ing for abortions in place. Details regarding these laws are available in
the Bitler and Zavodny article.23
In some specifications, I control for a host of other covariates.
These include the labor force participation rate of women in the state,
the unemployment rate in the state, real state income per capita, the
percent of the state's population that lives in rural areas, the percent
with a college education, and the respective percentages of the state
population indicating they belong to the following religious groups:
Mormon, Southern Baptists, Catholics, and Protestants. Descriptive
statistics, as well as data sources, are available in Table 1.
Table 1:
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Description Mean Std. Source
Dev.
Female Number of sui- 7.085 2.288 National Cen-
Suicide Rate cides among ter for Health
women ages Statistics,
25-64 per Centers for
100,000 women Disease Con-
in the popula- trol 24
tion in that age
range
21 id.
22 Marianne Bitler & Madeline Zavodny, The Effect of Abortion Restrictions
on the Timing ofAbortions, 20 J. HEALTH ECON. 1011 (2001).
23 Id. at 1013-14. For current state laws on mandatory waiting periods, see
ALAN GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: MANDATORY COUNSELING AND
WAITING PERIODS FOR ABORTION 2 (2005), http://www.agi-usa.org/statecenter/spibs/
spib MWPA.pdf. For the current state of Medicaid funding restrictions, see ALAN
GUTrMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: STATE FUNDING OF ABORTION UNDER
MEDICAID 2 (2005), http://www.agi-usa.org/statecenter/spibs/spibSFAM.pdf.
24 Dep't of Health and Human Servs., supra note 20.
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Table 1:
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Description Mean Std. Source
Dev.
Male Number of 26.173 12.361 National
Suicide Rate suicides among Center for
men ages 25- Health
64 per 100,000 Statistics,
men in the Centers for
population in Disease
that age range Control
25
Delay Percent of year 0.055 0.224 Bitler and
state had man- Zavodny
26
datory waiting
period before
an abortion can
be obtained in
effect
Medicaid Percent of year 0.704 0.452 Bitler and
Restriction state restricted Zavodny
27
Medicaid fund-
ing for abor-
tions
Female Labor force 57.899 5.174 Bureau of
Labor participation Labor
Participation rate of women Statistics
Unemploy- Unemployment 6.279 2.175 Bureau of
ment rate Labor
Statistics
Real Income Per capita in- 138.043 23.103 Bureau of
come adjusted Economic
for inflation in Analysis
$100s
Rural Percent of state 31.367 14.544 Bureau of the
population Census
living in rural
areas
25 Id.
26 Bitler & Zavodny, supra note 22.
27 Id.
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Table 1:
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Description Mean Std. Source
Dev.
College Percent of state 19.883 4.407 Bureau of the
population Census
ages 25 and
older that has
graduated from
college
Mormon Percent of state 3.054 10.223 Glenmary
population Research Cen-
identified as ter
28
belonging to
Mormon relig-
ion
Baptist Percent of state 7.346 10.117 Glenmary
population Research
identified as Center29
belonging to
Southern Bap-
tist congrega-
tion
Catholic Percent of state 19.000 13.058 Glenmary
population Research
identified as Center
30
being Roman
Catholic
Protestant Percent of state 21.911 9.818 Glenmary
population Research
belonging to a Center3'
mainline Prot-
estant church
28 GLENMARY RESEARCH CENTER, RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS &
MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 2000: AN ENUMERATION BY REGION, STATE AND
COuNTY BASED ON DATA REPORTED FOR 149 RELIGIOUS BODIES (Dale E. Jones et al.
eds., 2002).
29 Id.
30 id,
31 Id.
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Table 1:
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Description Mean Std. Source
Dev.
Psychiatrists Number of 21.301 8.780 American
psychiatrists Medical
practicing in Association
state per
100,000 popu-
lation
Mental State and 41.750 21.138 National
Health federal per Association of
Spending capita State Mental
spending on Health
mental health Program
services Directors
Republican = 1 if state had 0.481 0.500 Statistical
Governor Republican Abstract of
governor United States
Republican Percent of 0.432 0.175 Statistical
Lower House seats in state Abstract of
legislature's United States
lower house
held by
Republicans
Republican Percent of 0.430 0.180 Statistical
Upper House seats in state Abstract of
legislature's United States
upper house
held by
Republicans
III. SPECIFICATIONS
For my dependent variable, I take the natural log of the suicide
rate data described above. Although my results are qualitatively simi-
lar if I focus on the non-transformed suicide rate, taking the natural
log aids in exposition of the results.32 The general setup of my statisti-
cal models is to include dummy variable controls for each state to
32 Particularly, it allows one to interpret coefficients on dichotomous vari-
ables as percentage changes and coefficients on other logged variables as elasticities.
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capture idiosyncratic differences in suicide rates among the states that
do not change over time. I also include dummy variables for each year
within the analysis to control for any national temporal effects occur-
ring in the time period studied. The general model then takes the fol-
lowing form:
In (suicides,) = a. delays, + EzX t + , +,r,
in which s denotes the state and t denotes the year of the observation.
The "delay" variable represents the fraction of year t in which state s
had a delay law in effect. The next term represents the vector of state-
level covariates for year t. The next term represents constant state
specific effects, and the last term indicates individual year effects that
do not vary from state to state.
To mitigate concerns that unobservable variables that affect sui-
cide rates could be changing at the same time delay laws are adopted
(e.g., changes in how fastidiously authorities investigate suspicious
deaths that could be suicides), in some specifications, I include the
contemporaneous measure of male suicide rates which should control
for any effects that are common to all suicides.
In some instances, I also include a more complicated time effect,
allowing each state to have its own independent trend in the data. For
example, a particular state may be on a downward trajectory regarding
suicide rates independent of anything that happens to change with
respect to abortion laws.
I perform weighted least squares regression techniques on these
data where I weight each observation by the female population of the
state that is between the ages of twenty-five and sixty-four. I perform
this weighting since the dependent variable is a rate to allow observa-
tions from larger states to have proportionately greater effect on my
estimates. I also use report standard errors that are clustered at the
state level. This allows for correlation among observations from a
given state (say due to the continued existence of a given culture, so-
cial institutions, etc.) while assuming independence between observa-
tions from two different states.
Given recent concerns by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan,33 in
some specifications, I also allow for autocorrelation among observa-
tions, as well as heteroskedasticity. These concerns arise from the
33 See Marianne Bertrand et al., How Much Should We Trust Differences-In-
Differences Estimates?, 119 Q. J. ECON. 249, 273-74 (2004) (investigating "how
several standard estimation methods help deal with the serial correlation problem in
the [Differences-in-Differences] context").
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likelihood that there is some inertia in state policies (i.e., once states
pass a law, it is likely to endure for a while) which limits the inde-
pendence of observations across time. To correct for this, I use
Newey-West Heteroskedastic-Autocorrelation-Consistent (HAG)
standard errors in some specifications.
IV. RESULTS
In the most basic regression, as described above, I regress the
natural log of state suicide rates among women ages twenty-five to
sixty-four for the years 1981-1998 on the delay variable, the Medi-
caid funding restriction variable, a set of state-specific effects, and
year effects common to all states, as well as the following covariates:
female labor force participation; state unemployment rate; real per
capita income in the state; percent of the state's population living in
rural areas; the percent of the state population with some college edu-
cation; the percent of the state population that identifies itself as
Mormon, Southern Baptist, Catholic, and Protestant; the number of
psychiatrists per capita in the state; and state mental health spending
per capita. I weight each observation by the population of women in
the twenty-five to sixty-four age range and I cluster standard errors by
state.
As indicated in Table 2, I find a large negative effect of the adop-
tion of mandatory waiting periods on female suicide rates, and the
effect is statistically significant at the 6 percent level. Effectively, I
find that the adoption of a waiting period by a state reduces its female
suicide rate by almost 10 percent. Among the covariates, I find statis-
tically significant effects from unemployment suggesting that suicide
rates and unemployment rates move in the same direction.
Also, there appears to be a negative relationship between college
attendance and suicide rates. The negative relationship between Prot-
estant market share and suicide is the only statistically significant ef-
fect I find among the religion variables. Lastly, the positive associa-
tion between the presence of psychiatrists and suicide would appear to
be the result of reverse causality (i.e., places with lots of suicides tend
to draw more psychiatrists, not vice versa). The regression appears to
explain about 80 percent of the variation in state suicide rates among
women as indicated by the R squared statistic.
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Table 2:
The Effect of Abortion Waiting
Periods on Female Suicide Rates
(p values in parentheses)
Variable Coefficient
Delay -0.094
(0.064)
Medicaid 0.061
Restriction (0.177)
Female Labor 0.004
Participation (0.381)
Unemployment 0.018
(0.007)
Real Income -0.001
(0.610)
Rural -0.001
(0.904)
College -0.016
(0.004)
Mormon -0.001
(0.990)
Baptist 0.011
(0.570)
Catholic -0.011
(0.910)
Protestant -0.012
(0.028)
Psychiatrists 0.025
(0.002)
Mental Health 0.001
Spending (0.514)
Observations 900
R2 0.85
In the regression results presented in Table 3, I include state spe-
cific-trends which will help to rule out the possibility that the adoption
of waiting periods happens to coincide with pre-existing state trends.
For example, if states that adopt abortion waiting periods also happen
to be states in the midst of a downward trend in female suicides, then
the estimated relationship between waiting periods and suicides would
not be causal.
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MANDA TORY WAITING PERIODS FOR ABORTIONS
Including the state-specific trends does not change the coefficient
on waiting period adoption very much. I find that the adoption of a
waiting period reduces the suicide rate by almost 11 percent and the
effect is statistically significant at the 1.4 percent level. For the other
covariates that had generated statistically significant coefficients, only
unemployment remains important in this regression. Interestingly, this
regression also implies that the adoption of state Medicaid finding
restrictions is associated with an increase in the female suicide rate. 34
This regression explains about 84 percent of the variation in state sui-
cide rates.
Table 3:
Waiting Periods and Female
Suicide Rates
Including State Trends
(p values in parentheses)
Variable Coefficient
Delay -0.106
(0.014)
Medicaid 0.091
Restriction (0.038)
Female Labor -0.003
Participation (0.559)
Unemployment 0.017
(0.084)
Real Income -0.002
(0.508)
Rural 0.001
(0.940)
College -0.006
(0.303)
Mormon -0.016
(0.374)
Baptist -0.055
(0.148)
Catholic 0.014
(0.520)
34 Although not examined here, the author is pursuing this result in another
article. This result turns out to be robust to a number of specifications. The causal
mechanism presumably involves the stress that women endure when they no longer
have access to subsidized abortions such as enduring pregnancy and possibly facing
the prospect of being responsible for a child the women did not want.
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Table 3:
Waiting Periods and Female
Suicide Rates
Including State Trends
(p values in parentheses)
Variable Coefficient
Protestant 0.001
(0.899)
Psychiatrists 0.003
(0.664)
Mental Health 0.001
Spending (0.704)
Observations 900
R2 0.844
Before drawing conclusions about causality in statistical relation-
ships, it is important to explore the possibility that unobserved
changes are not correlated both with the dependent variable (female
suicide rates) and the policy variable of interest (adoption of waiting
periods). This omitted variable bias can lead to spurious correlations.35
In this context, omitted variables bias could arise because of changes
in the way the suicide data are collected, changes in relevant state
policies (e.g., changes in alcohol taxes), etc. To mitigate this concern,
in the regression presented in Table 4, I present the state-trends re-
gression from Table 3, but now I include the male suicide rate to cap-
ture any unobserved changes that affect suicide at the time waiting
periods are adopted.
Again, I find that waiting periods lead to a 10 percent decline in
the female suicide rate, and this coefficient is statistically significant
at the 2.2 percent level. Medicaid funding restrictions are once again
associated with a statistically significant increase in suicides. Of inter-
est, lastly, there is a very strong correlation between female and male
suicide rates. The coefficient implies an elasticity of 0.42, meaning
that when the male suicide rate goes up by 1 percent, the female sui-
cide rate goes up by 0.42 percent. The regression explains more than
85 percent of the variation in state suicide rates.
35 See WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 334 (4th ed. 2003).
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Table 4:
Waiting Periods and Female
Suicide Rates Including State
Trends and Male Rates
(p values in parentheses)
Variable Coefficient
Delay -0.104
(0.022)
Medicaid 0.074
Restriction (0.052)
ln(Male Suicide 0.417
Rate) (0.000)
Female Labor -0.004
Participation (0.349)
Unemployment 0.011
(0.168)
Real Income -0.002
(0.522)
Rural -0.000
(0.973)
College -0.005
(0.365)
Mormon -0.005
(0.760)
Baptist -0.036
(0.297)
Catholic 0.009
(0.069)
Protestant -0.006
(0.339)
Psychiatrists 0.006
(0.378)
Mental Health 0.001
Spending (0.490)
Observations 900
R- 0.852
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The concern revolves around the inertia that generally exists such that
once a law is passed, it generally does not get overturned randomly.
Instead, it tends to stay in effect indefinitely. This has the potential to
generate autocorrelation in the estimates of these models. To mitigate
this concern, I re-estimated the model presented in Table 4 using
Newey-West Heteroskedastic-Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC)
standard errors36 choosing the lag structure optimally.
37
As shown in Table 5, the statistical significance of the coefficient
generated by the waiting period variable and that generated by the
Medicaid funding restriction variable remain unchanged.
Table 5:
Waiting Periods and Female
Suicide Rates Including State
Trends and Male Rates
(p values in parentheses)
Variable Coefficient
Delay -0.104
(0.012)
Medicaid 0.074
Restriction (0.034)
ln(Male Suicide 0.417
Rate) (0.000)
Female Labor -0.004
Participation (0.329)
Unemployment 0.011
(0.084)
Real Income -0.002
(0.390)
Rural -0.000
(0.970)
College -0.005
(0.332)
Mormon -0.005
(0.813)
Baptist -0.036
(0.181)
36 See JAMES H. STOCK & MARK W. WATSON, INTRODUCTION TO
ECONOMETRICS 506 (2003) (discussing when HAC standard errors should be used).
37 Id. at 505 (explaining how to strike a balance by choosing the number of
autocorrelations depending on the sample size).
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Table 5:
Waiting Periods and Female
Suicide Rates Including State
Trends and Male Rates
(p values in parentheses)
Variable Coefficient
Catholic 0.009
(0.503)
Protestant -0.006
(0.314)
Psychiatrists 0.006
(0.372)
Mental Health 0.001
Spending (0.453)
Observations 900
The effect of the adoption of mandatory waiting periods before an
abortion can be performed appears to be quite robust. That is,
regardless of the model used to investigate this effect, it would appear
that waiting periods reduce suicide among women in the twenty-five
to sixty-four age range. Further, this effect is quite large, hovering
around the 10 percent mark. Additionally, restrictions on Medicaid
funding for abortions seem to have the opposite effect, yielding
statistically significant increases in the female suicide rate of about 7
percent.
To subject this relationship to one more robustness check, I also
examined an instrumental variables (IV) procedure to rule out the
possibility that the passage of waiting periods and female suicide are
somehow jointly determined. That is, for regression techniques to
yield an unbiased estimate of the effect of waiting periods on suicide,
it must not be the case that waiting periods are adopted in response to
suicide rates or that some unknown factor is causally related to both
suicide rates and the adoption of waiting periods.38
To implement IV procedures in this context, one must identify a
set of "instruments" that are predictive of the adoption of mandatory
waiting periods that are otherwise unrelated to female suicide rates.
The analyst then performs a two-step procedure in which the waiting
38 See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION
AND PANEL DATA 83-107 (2002) (discussing instrumental variable estimation).
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period variable is regressed on all of the covariates and the set of in-
struments to yield estimates of the likelihood that the waiting period is
in effect in a given state during a given year. These predicted vari-
ables are then used in the second stage of the regression as proxies for
the delay variable. If the set of instruments is highly predictive of the
delay variable, and diagnostic tests suggest that the instruments are
not otherwise related to suicide rates, the coefficient estimated in the
second stage represents an unbiased estimate of the causal effect of
adopting waiting periods on female suicide rates.
For my IV estimation, I use the following instruments. First, I in-
clude an indicator for whether or not the state's governor is from the
Republican Party. Presumably, Republicans are more likely to support
restrictions on abortion access, so we should expect a positive rela-
tionship between this instrument and the adoption of mandatory delay
laws. Second, I include the fraction of seats in the state's lower legis-
lative body that are held by Republicans based on the same intuition.
Third, I include the fraction of seats in the state's upper legislative
body that are held by Republicans for the same reason.
I present the first stage results in Table 6. As predicted, all of my
instruments have a statistically significant positive effect on the adop-
tion of waiting periods. Further, their joint significance of 10.58 is
quite high, suggesting that they are powerful instruments in the first
stage.39
Table 6:
First Stage Regression Predicting
the Adoption of Waiting Periods
(p values in parentheses)
Variable Coefficient
Republican 0.052
Governor (0.000)
Republican 0.316
Lower House (0.005)
Republican 0.306
Upper House (0.006)
Medicaid -0.016
Restriction (0.562)
39 The conventional cut-off for a first stage F statistic for the instruments is
10. See John Bound et al., Problems with Instrumental Variables Estimation When the
Correlation Between the Instruments and the Endogenous Explanatory Variable Is
Weak, 90 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 443 (1995).
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The second stage results are presented in Table 7. Again, I find
that the adoption of waiting periods has a statistically significant (p =
4.8 percent) negative effect on female suicide rates. These results im-
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Table 6:
First Stage Regression Predicting
the Adoption of Waiting Periods
(p values in parentheses)
Variable Coefficient
ln(Male Suicide 0.000
Rate) (0.997)
Female Labor 0.002
Participation (0.607)
Unemployment 0.016
(0.005)
Real Income 0.007
(0.000)
Rural -0.046
(0.000)
College 0.014
(0.016)
Mormon -0.115
(0.000)
Baptist 0.043
(0.033)
Catholic 0.036
(0.000)
Protestant -0.006
(0.119)
Psychiatrists 0.001
(0.869)
Mental Health 0.000
Spending (0.952)
Observations 899
F for 10.58
Instruments (0.000)
R2 for 0.067
Instruments
R2 0.788
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ply that my earlier regressions underestimated the true causal effect of
delay laws. The IV results suggest that the passage of waiting period
laws lowers female suicide rates by about 30 percent. Further, the test
of overidentifying restrictions suggests that the instruments are ex-
.ogenous to female suicide rates.40 This diagnostic statistic along with
the high first stage F suggests that these results sufficiently account
for any bias arising for simultaneous determination of the adoption of
mandatory waiting periods and female suicide rates.
4o See WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 38, at 122-24 (explaining testing of overi-
dentifying restrictions).
Table 7:
Second Stage Results from IV
Analysis of Waiting Periods and
Suicide
(p values in parentheses)
Variable Coefficient
Delay -0.298
(0.048)
Medicaid 0.066
Restriction (0.060)
ln(Male Suicide 0.414
Rate) (0.000)
Female Labor -0.004
Participation (0.340)
Unemployment 0.016
(0.025)
Real Income -0.001
(0.825)
Rural -0.010
(0.384)
College -0.002
(0.611)
Mormon -0.029
(0.388)
Baptist -0.032
(0.214)
Catholic 0.015
(0.196)
(Vol. 16:183
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V. POSSIBLE CAUSAL MECHANISMS
Given the foregoing results, it appears as though there is a strong
causal relationship between the adoption of mandatory waiting peri-
ods for abortions and female suicide rates. What mechanism drives
this decrease in suicide rates? I have suggested, on the basis of the
arguments made by supporters of waiting periods, that waiting periods
induce added reflection on the part of a woman seeking an abortion.
This added reflection presumably causes a woman to have less regret
after having an abortion, decreasing the incidence of depression and
ultimately of suicide.
However, it could be the case that waiting periods generate this
effect by reducing the number of abortions. If abortion itself leads to a
heightened risk for suicide, then a decrease in the number of abortions
would be expected to lower the suicide rate. It is not clear whether
waiting periods do reduce the abortion rate,4 ' so this mechanism is
41 See, e.g., Ted Joyce & Robert Kaestner, The Impact of Mandatory Waiting
Periods and Parental Consent Laws on the Timing of Abortion and State of Occur-
rence Among Adolescents in Mississippi and South Carolina, 20 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 263 (2001) (finding that waiting periods might cause individuals to travel to
other states to obtain an abortion but that generally waiting periods have no effect on
the timing of abortions). Bitler and Zavodny find no systematic effect of waiting
periods on abortion rates, though, in some specifications, they do find that the adop-
tion of waiting periods is associated with a shift in the timing of abortions with post
first term abortions substituted for first term abortions. Bitler & Zavodny, supra note
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Table 7:
Second Stage Results from IV
Analysis of Waiting Periods and
Suicide
(p values in parentheses)
Variable Coefficient
Protestant -0.006
(0.244)
Psychiatrists 0.006
(0.377)
Mental Health 0.001
Spending (0.539)
Observations 899
R2  0.848
Hansen J 0.215
Statistic (0.898)
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questionable and deserves more study. Further, the results regarding
the effect of Medicaid funding restrictions cut against this interpreta-
tion as well. I find indications of a positive association between Medi-
caid funding restrictions and the suicide rate that are fairly robust, and
others have documented the negative relationship between funding
restrictions and the abortion rate.42 Thus, if there was a strong positive
association between abortion and suicide, we would expect to see a
negative coefficient for the Medicaid funding restriction variable in
the regressions above.
I am exploring this topic much more carefully in another work in
progress, focusing on a number of policies that have a documented
negative effect on abortion access. If the results continue to suggest a
positive relationship between suicide and policies that actually inhibit
(as opposed to merely delay) access to abortion, the question arises as
to what light this sheds on other work that appears to find a positive
association between abortion and suicide.
The most prominent of these studies was done by Mika Gissler
and colleagues who examined data from the Finish Hospital Dis-
charge Registry.43 They found that there were 5.9 suicides per 100,000
women giving birth during the period 1987-1994. 44 This compares
favorably to the rate of suicide among the general population of
women which was 11.3 per 100,000 women in the population.45 For
those women who miscarried their pregnancy, the suicide rate was
18.1 per 100,000 women who miscarried.46 Lastly, they found that
ending a pregnancy through an induced abortion was associated with a
suicide rate of 34.7 per 100,000 women who received abortions.47
This increased risk of suicide was found throughout the various age
groups.
48
These results led the researchers to propose two competing hy-
potheses about the causal mechanism relating abortion to suicide.
They posit that either abortion generates harmful effects for a
woman's mental health or there are common unobserved characteris-
22, at 1030.
42 See, e.g., Phillip B. Levine et al., The Effect of Medicaid Abortion Funding
Restrictions on Abortions, Pregnancies and Births, 15 J. HEALTH ECON. 555, 555
(1996).
43 Gissler et al., supra note 17, at 1431.
44 Id. at 1432.
41 Id. at 1431.
46 Id. at 1432.
47 Id.
48 id.
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tics or risk factors that lead a woman to end her pregnancy in abortion
and also lead her to commit suicide.49
While my results are still preliminary, they would seem to support
the self-selection hypothesis more strongly than the adverse effects
hypothesis. Medicaid funding restrictions represent an exogenous
shock to abortion access that is largely unrelated to any of an
individual's unobserved risk factors, allowing us to approximate the
kind of random assignment to abortion that would be necessary to rule
out the self-selection problem. To the extent that the Medicaid
funding restriction coefficients hold up in my continuing research,
they would suggest that after one controls for the common risk factors
that contribute to an individual's propensity to have an abortion and to
commit suicide, the causal effect of abortion and suicide is actually
negative. That is, it would seem that, at least for the relatively poor,
limiting the option for abortion increases the likelihood of suicide.
This is consistent with the Gissler study which found an increased
incidence of suicide among poor mothers who carried their babies to
term. Presumably, people in this economic group on the margin are
ill-equipped to deal with the burdens that come with caring for a baby,
leading to increased stress and depression.
To the extent that there is any positive association between abor-
tion and suicide, independent of the self-selection effect, my results on
the effect of mandatory waiting periods suggest that regret over a
hastily made decision to abort could be at the root of the association.
Thus, interventions that inform and counsel a pregnant mother regard-
ing the resolution of her unplanned pregnancy could significantly im-
prove the welfare of women. The reduction in suicides represents only
a lower bound of the benefits of these interventions, since presumably
there are a number of women in this situation who have regret and
suffer depression because of it without rising to the suicide threshold.
Waiting periods and counseling would likely benefit these individuals
too.
VI. EXTENSIONS
As discussed above, I am currently developing an expanded
analysis of the effect of abortion restrictions on female suicide rates.
Of particular interest, in the context of the results presented here, is an
analysis of whether waiting periods lead to significant changes in
abortion rates. If, as many pro-abortion rights groups claim, waiting
periods deter very few women from having abortions, this would sug-
I d. at 1431, 1433-34.
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gest that the effect identified here is entirely due to women feeling
more comfortable about their decisions to abort, leading to less regret
and attendant depression. On the other hand, if the assertion about the
relationship between waiting periods and abortion rates is not sup-
ported by the data, and the adoption of waiting periods does system-
atically reduce the abortion rate, it might suggest that abortion does
lead to adverse effects for some women, leading to mental illness and
eventual suicide.
Such a result would be hard to square with the coefficients esti-
mated here for the effect of Medicaid funding restrictions, assuming
they hold up. Perhaps there is a heterogeneity of effects in which, for
poor women, the burden of an unwanted child dominates the regret
effect and greater abortion access is more favorable for mental health,
while for more affluent women, the regret effect tends to dominate,
implying that waiting periods and counseling will be welfare-
improving for individuals from this segment of society.
In addition to examining the Medicaid funding restrictions more
carefully and investigating the effect of waiting periods on abortion
rates, I also plan to examine these issues for teenagers specifically.
The Gissler study suggests that teens suffer pronounced increases in
suicide incidence both when they have an abortion and when they
carry a child to term (interestingly, they are the only age group that
exhibits the latter effect). Further, we might think that teens are par-
ticularly susceptible to making rash decisions and thus could espe-
cially benefit from waiting periods. Also, with teens, I can exploit an
additional public policy that affects abortion access, namely parental
involvement laws, which have large effects on the abortion rates of
teens.5°
CONCLUSION
Debates over abortion policy have not grown any more concilia-
tory in the three decades since the Supreme Court decided Roe v.
Wade.51 In recent confirmation hearings, Judge John Roberts was
questioned repeatedly about his views on a woman's right to abor-
tion.52 Groups favoring abortion rights undertook large campaigns to
50 See Bitter & Zavodny, supra note 22.
51 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
52 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be
Chief Justice of the United States Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
27-28, 37, 47, 142, 145, 160, 186, 206, 224-25, 237-38, 255, 268, 284, 289, 290, 295,
299, 325, 381, 393, 401, 476, 521, 525, 537-39, 541 (2005), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov.
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undercut the Roberts nomination because their members believe Rob-
erts harbors pro-life sympathies and a disdain for the jurisprudential
foundations of Roe.53
In society at large, though Americans favor keeping abortion legal
by a slight majority, large majorities of people support some or all of
the various restrictions states have placed on abortion access, includ-
ing parental involvement laws, Medicaid funding restrictions, and pre-
abortion waiting periods and counseling. Although most individuals
decide their positions on these various matters on the basis of norma-
tive principles, these various policies have the potential to generate
significant welfare effects on a number of different dimensions.
Empirical examination of these welfare effects is important to in-
form state abortion policy, particularly given the divisions that exist
among voters on the basic normative principles. If there is no norma-
tive consensus, presumably consequentialist concerns can break the
deadlock. Social scientists have weighed in on a host of the policy
implications of abortion access, ranging from crime to sexually trans-
mitted diseases, fertility trends, and child abuse. We know much more
about the social effects of abortion than we did ten years ago, and
hopefully researchers will continue in this vein.
This paper attempts to make progress on one dimension of the
consequences of changes in abortion access. I examine the relation-
ship between the adoption of mandatory waiting periods before which
an abortion can be secured and the mental health of women seeking
abortions. I find that the adoption of mandatory waiting periods re-
duces female suicide rates anywhere between 10 and 30 percent. This
effect is statistically significant and robust to a range of controls for
simultaneity bias, including the use of state-specific trends and in-
strumental variables analysis.
It would appear as though waiting periods (and the counseling
that usually accompanies them) induce a more reasoned approach to
the abortion decision, avoiding rash decisions on the part of the preg-
nant women. Better decision-making processes presumably lead to
fewer regrets later on, lowering the incidence of depression and, ulti-
mately, suicide. These results suggest mandatory waiting periods rep-
resent public policies that generate large welfare gains for women
faced with unwanted pregnancies.
Although the relationship is not investigated as rigorously here, it
also appears as though restricting Medicaid funding for abortions
53 See, e.g., Mark Memmott, Special Interests Gear Up for Fight on Court
Vacancy, USA Today, Sept. 6, 2005, at 16A; and Jill Zuckman & Frank James, Judge
Meets His Jury on Capitol Hill, CHIc. TRIB., July 21, 2005, at 14.
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leads to an increase in female suicide rates. It would seem that fund-
ing restrictions lower the access one has to abortion services, leading
women to bear the burdens of childbirth and child rearing for which
they may not be ready. This apparently leads to increases in stress
levels and eventually a rising suicide rate.
This latter result suggests previous research that identified a posi-
tive relationship between abortion and suicide might have suffered
from self selection problems to the extent that similar characteristics
lead a woman to both have an abortion and to commit suicide. If self-
selection does not completely explain this empirical finding, then it
might be the case that the relationship differs by socio-economic
class, with abortion access restrictions leading to improved mental
health for wealthier women and worsened mental health for poor
women. This demands further research.
